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Abstract. Evidence and Evolution: the Logic behind the Science was published
in 2008 by Elliott Sober. It examines the philosophical foundations of the sta-
tistical arguments used to evaluate hypotheses in evolutionary biology, based on
simple examples and likelihood ratios. The difficulty with reading the book from
a statistician’s perspective is the reluctance of the author to engage into model
building and even less into parameter estimation. The first chapter nonetheless
constitutes a splendid coverage of the most common statistical approaches to test-
ing and model comparison, even though the advocation of the Akaike information
criterion against Bayesian alternatives is rather forceful. The book also covers an
examination of the “intelligent design” arguments against the Darwinian evolution
theory, predictably if unnecessarily resorting to Popperian arguments to correctly
argue that the creationist perspective fails to predict anything. The following
chapters cover the more relevant issues of assessing selection versus drift and of
testing for the presence of a common ancestor. While remaining a philosophy
treatise, Evidence and Evolution is written in a way that is accessible to laymen, if
rather unusual from a statistician viewpoint, and the insight about testing issues
gained from Evidence and Evolution makes it a worthwhile read.
Keywords: Foundations, frequentist statistics, Bayesian statistics, likelihood, evolu-
tion, Darwin, cladistic parsimony, random drift, selection, hypothesis testing, model
comparison, model, data.
1 Introduction
The book Evidence and Evolution is written by Elliott Sober, a philosopher of science
who has worked on the notion of evidence, in the statistical meaning (Jeffreys, 1939)
of the word. All chapters are related to papers authored or co-authored by him over
the past years. Evidence and Evolution does not aim at demonstrating the validity of
one evolution theory against another but rather at validating statistical ways of testing
such hypotheses. While Sober establishes that creationism cannot be analysed within
this framework because it fails to make predictions, the remaining chapters consider
ways to evaluate evidence about natural selection (against the drift alternative) and
about common ancestry, without concluding about those. Sober also relates very much
to the original works of Charles Darwin, sometimes making too much of rather general
sentences of his, but this historical touch adds nonetheless to the already considerable
appeal of the book.
First, an acknowledgement of my limitations is in order: As a statistician, I cannot
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evaluate the philosophical relevance of the book, even though the arguments are quite
accessible to a layman like me. I however appreciate the critical assessment of Popper’s
testability criterion when applied to creationism as well as the extensive coverage of sta-
tistical principles for testing. A philosophical perspective on Evidence and Evolution is
given by Pfeifer (2009). Furthermore, being equally a layman in population genetics
and evolution biology, I have difficulties in assessing the impact of the debate about the
construction of tests on biologists, as the examples seemed to be too formalised and sim-
plistic to be realistic. My review is therefore necessarily biased towards a statistician’s
perspective and hence maybe unnecessarily critical in terms of what I perceive as a lack
of proper modelling. Indeed, I bemoan the absence throughout the book of a genuine
statistical framework that would allow for a complete statistical analysis of even one
single real dataset, including the estimation aspects that are bypassed in Evidence and
Evolution, as this would illustrate much more clearly the concepts at work.
In addition, while I understand the historical and philosophical appeals of discussing
creationism, since Darwin was subjected to many attacks on this very issue, I am quite
skeptical on the impact the book could have on the current debate. Unsurprisingly (and I
will explain why below), the book remains at a very general and hence vague level when
discussing creationism. There are so many possible versions about the intervention
of a god or of another supernatural being in the management of the World that to
pick one particular version would be like grabbing at water, all other remaining versions
emerging unscathed from a detailed criticism of the chosen version. But to maintain that
creationism is testable (in Popper’s sense), as Sober does, is to open a similar Pandora
box about which version he is considering. I thus personally deplore the inclusion of this
chapter in Evidence and Evolution, even though this position is not taken on statistical
grounds.
The review linearly proceeds through the four chapters of the book, “Evidence”
(Chap. 1), “Intelligent design” (Chap. 2), “Natural selection” (Chap. 3), “Common an-
cestry” (Chap. 4). Once again, it primarily focus on the statistical aspects of the debate
initiated by Sober without discussing the biological or philosophical consequences. Al-
though a hard read at times, proceeding through Evidence and Evolution was a worthy
and rewarding experience for me that led me to re-think the terms and objects of sta-
tistical testing when applied to a scientific theory. The book is accessible to the layman
(in any of those three fields) and I thus encourage readers to progress through Evidence
and Evolution.
2 Statistical evidence
“Although frequency data and a well-supported empirical theory can provide a
basis for assigning prior probabilities, the principle of indifference cannot.” Elliott
Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.27
The first chapter is fairly well written and presents a reasonable picture on the differ-
ent perspectives (Bayesian, likelihood, frequentist) used for hypothesis testing and model
choice, if missing references to the relevant literature (for instance, Berger and Wolpert,
1988 is omitted when the likelihood principle is discussed). Akaike’s information crite-
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rion is promoted as the method of choice, but this is a well-established model choice
tool that can be accepted at a general level. I paradoxically find the introduction to
Bayesian principles to be overly long (as often the case in cognitive sciences) since, as
the author acknowledges from the start, “Bayes Theorem is a result in mathematics
[that] is derivable from the axioms of probability theory” (page 8). This is especially
blatant when considering that Sober takes a very long while to introduce prior densities
on parameter spaces, a reluctance that agrees with the parameter free preferences of
the book. The (standard) criticisms he addresses to the choice of those priors (which
should be “empirically well-grounded”, pages 26 and 27, as also pointed out in the
above quote) will periodically resurface throughout the book, but they are far from
convincing as they mistake the role of the prior distributions as reference measures
(Bernardo and Smith, 1994) for expressions of truth. The extended criticism of the
foundations of Neymann–Pearson testing procedures is quite thorough and could bene-
fit genuine statistician readers as well as philosophers and biologists.
“The Akaike framework makes plausible a mixed philosophy: instrumentalism for
models, realism for fitted models” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.98
At a general level, I have two statistical difficulties with this chapter. First, while
Sober introduces the Akaike information criterion as a natural penalty for comparing
models with different difficulties, I fear the notions of statistical parsimony and dimen-
sion penalty are mentioned much too late in the chapter. Using a likelihood ratio for
embedded models is for instance meaningless unless a correction for the difference in
dimensions is introduced. Second, the models used in this chapter and throughout the
book are singularly missing variable parameters, which makes all tests appear as com-
parison of point null hypotheses. The presence of nuisance or interest parameters should
be better acknowledged.
“Bayesianism is a substantive epistemology, not a truism.” Elliott Sober, Evolution
and Evidence, p.107
At a specific level, it is not possible to address all minor points with which I disagree
but I think Sober is misrepresenting the Bayesian approach to model choice and that he
is missing the central role played by the Bayes factor in this approach. The fact that the
Bayes factor is an automated Ockham’s razor with the proper penalty for differences
in dimension (MacKay, 2002) is altogether missed. In particular, Sober reproduces the
error found in Templeton’s (2010). He indeed states that “the simpler model cannot
have the higher prior probability, a point that Popper (1959) emphasised” (page 83).
And he insists further that there is no reason for thinking that
P (θ = 0) > P (θ > 0)
is true (page 84). (This common sense constraint obviously does not make sense for
continuous state spaces since comparing models requires working with foreign dominat-
ing measures.) Even though the likelihood ratio is a central quantity in the chapters to
follow, I am also reluctant to agree with introducing a specific category for likelihood-
ists (sic!) since, besides a Bayesian incorporation, a calibrated likelihood leads either
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to a frequentist Neymann–Pearson test or to a predictive tool like Akaike’s (which is
also frequentist in that it is an unbiased estimator). In addition, the defence of the
Akaike criterion is overdone, in particular the discussion about the unbiasedness of AIC
which confuses the fact that the averaged log-likelihood is an unbiased estimator of the
Kullback–Leibler divergence with the issue that the AIC involves a plug-in estimator of
the parameters, as shown on pages 85 and 101. The arguments for AIC versus BIC are
rather weak, from BIC being biased (correct but irrelevant) and Bayesian (incorrect), to
the fact that it contradicts the above fallacious ordering of simple versus complex mod-
els. A discussion of the encompassing framework of George and Foster (2000) would
have been most welcomed at this stage.
While the above points are due criticisms (from a statistician), the fact remains
that this chapter is an exceptionally good and lucid discussion on the philosophy of
testing and that it could well serve as the basis of a graduate reading seminar. I thus
recommend the to all statistician readers and teachers.
3 ”Intelligent design”
“When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations
from the purpose which God or nature may have had in view when creating them
and we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes. For
we should not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans.”
Rene´ Descartes, Les Principes de la Philosophie, Livre I, 28.
The second chapter of Evidence and Evolution tries to address the case of “intelli-
gent” design from an epistemological perspective, namely as to whether or not evidence
based reasoning can be applied to this line of thoughts. As pointed above, I was loath
to get into this chapter for fear of being dragged into a barren and useless debate, but
it stands the test from an academic perspective in that the chapter is written from a
purely philosophical perspective. I was originally expecting more statistical arguments
given the tenor of the first chapter, but I realise this would have been a fruitless exercise
given the infinite polymorphism of “intelligent” design theories.1
“Tout e´tant fait pour une fin, tout est ne´cessairement pour la meilleure fin. Re-
marquez bien que les nez ont e´te´ faits pour porter des lunettes, aussi avons-nous
des lunettes.” Voltaire, Candide, Chapitre 1.
I find the introduction of the chapter interesting in that it relates the creationist
thesis to a long philosophical tradition (witness the above quote from Descartes) rather
than to the current unscientific debate about “teaching” creationism in US and UK
schools. The disputation of former theses like the one of Paley’s watch is however taking
most of the chapter and this is disappointing in my opinion.2 Somehow predictively (in
1At a purely anecdotal level, this chapter brought to me the interesting side informations that
Jonathan Swift’sGulliver’s Travelsmentions a random word generator and that John Arbuthnot created
the John Bull character.
2The remark that “Paley was well-aware of the relevant facts about monkeys and typewriters” (page
120) sounds like an anachronism, since the typewriter still had to emerge in the early 1800’s. A reference
to Voltaire’s Candide ridiculing design would have been more appropriate.
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the sense that this would have been my first argument), Sober mostly states the obvious
when arguing that when gods or other supernatural beings enter the picture, they can
explain for any observed fact with the highest likelihood while being unable to predict
any fact not yet observed. I would have preferred to see hard scientific facts and the use
of statistical evidence, even of the AIC sort, although as noted previously I can see the
ultimate lack of purpose in picking a specific version of creationism that could bend itself
to a full statistical analysis. While I consider Sober’s analysis of Popper’s testability
to be of independent interest, as it rightly remarks that all probabilistic theories are
unfalsifiable in Popper’s sense (page 130), it does not bring further arguments because
Sober coherently argues that even the theory of “intelligent” design is falsifiable.
“Bayesian philosophers of science see each hypothesis as competing with its own
negation.” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.354
In Section 2.19 about model selection, the comparison between a single parame-
ter model and a one million parameter model hints at Ockham’s razor (Adams, 1987;
Berger and Jefferys, 1992; Sober, 1994; MacKay, 2002), but, once again, Sober misses
the point about a major aspect of Bayesian analysis. Indeed, through the use of hy-
perpriors and hyperparameters, observations about one group of parameters also bring
information about other groups of parameters when those are related via a hyperprior
(as in small area estimation). Given that the author hardly ever discusses the use of
priors over the model parameters and seems to instead rely plug-in estimates, he does
not take advantage of the marginal posterior dependence between the different groups
of parameters.
4 Testing for selection
“To test a theory, you need to test it against alternatives.” Elliott Sober, Evolution
and Evidence, p.190
The “Natural selection” chapter is difficult to read for a layman like me in that
it seems overly repetitive, using somehow obvious arguments while missing clearcut
conclusions and directions. This bend must be due to the philosophical priorities of
the author but, despite opposing Brownian motion to Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes
at the beginning of the chapter (which would have made for a neat parametric model
comparison setting),3 there is no quantitative argument nor illustration found in this
third chapter that would relate to statistics. This is unfortunate as the questions of
interest (testing for natural selection versus pure drift or versus phylogenetic inertia or
yet for tree structure in phylogenetics) could clearly be conducted at a numerical level
as well, through the AIC factor or through a Bayesian alternative. The aspects I found
most interesting in this chapter may therefore be deemed as marginalia by most readers,
namely (a) the discussion whether or not the outcome of a test should at all depend on
3Both processes are dubbed natural by the author for pure drift and selection plus drift, respectively
(page 194). I would thus avoid this qualification since these are mathematical models and not natural
phenomena. Similarly, mentioning a bell curve on page 197 gives a confusing message since the setting
is not necessarily linked with the normal distribution.
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the modelling assumptions (the author seems to doubt this, hence relegating Bayesian
techniques to their dust-gathering shelves), and (b) the point that parsimony is not a
criterion per se.
“What we need is a probability distribution of the different values A might have,
conditional on each hypothesis.” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.210
About the first point, the philosophical stance of the author is not completely fool-
proof in that he concedes—witness the above quote—that testing hypotheses without
accounting for the alternative is not acceptable. This would almost irremediably call
for a truly Bayesian resolution, but my impression is that Sober looks at the problem
from a purely dichotomous perspective, either the hypothesis or the alternative being
true. This is a bit of a caricatural representation as he incorporates the issue of calibrat-
ing parameters under the different hypotheses, and there is a sort of logical discrepancy
lurking in the background of the argument. Again, working out a fully Bayesian analysis
of a philogenic tree—mentioned on page 190 as part of the model assumptions—would
have clarified the issue immensely. And rejecting Bayesianism on the ground that “there
is no objective basis for producing an answer” (page 239) is limited on the epistemolog-
ical side. This is particularly frustrating when considering the above quote where Sober
acknowledges the need for a posterior distribution over the ancestral trait A and where
he advocates using “equilibrium probabilities as priors for the state of the ancestor A”
(page 211).
Even though I understand that the book is not trying to debate about the support
for a specific evolutionary hypothesis but rather about the methods used to test such
hypotheses and the logic behind these, completely worked-out example would have made
my appreciation (and maybe other readers’) of Sober’s points much easier. To mention
one such issue, the construct of an efficiency or fitness function (discussed throughout
the chapter, see, e.g., page 196) that could drive the natural selection is not discussed
from a realistic biological perspective but strikes me instead as a purely formal entity.
(The exception being the aphid eating time of Figure 3.8.) Note that Section 3.9 is more
model oriented, using molecular data, although neither the significantly different (page
238) results nor the Akaike score are given. (There is also a conceptual mistake there
in that the neutral hypothesis is stated as d13 − d23 = 0 instead of E[d13 − d23] = 0,
see Figure 3.25 for a similar confusion.) Thus, I fail to see who could take benefit
from reading this chapter as a whole—even though particular points are worthwhile
contributions to the philosophy of testing. For instance, a biologist will most likely
process the arguments and illustrations provided by Sober but this biologist could leave
the chapter with a feeling of frustration at the apparent lack of conclusion. (As a
statistician, I fail to understand how the likelihoods repeatedly mentioned by Sober can
be computed because they never involve any parameter.)
“Parsimony does not provide a justification for ignoring the data.” Elliott Sober,
Evolution and Evidence, p.250
Since I believe that the Ockham’s razor argument has had a global negative im-
pact on the understanding of the parsimony requirement in testing (MacKay, 2002;
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Robert, 2007), I find the warning signals about parsimony (given in the last third of
the chapter) more palatable. Parsimony being an ill-defined concept, especially from a
statistical perspective (where even the dimension of the parameter space is debatable,
Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), no model selection is acceptable if only based on this argu-
ment. Note further that parsimony is understood in two different ways in the book, one
being connected to the Ockham’s razor and one leading to the specific phylogenetic par-
simonious reconstruction (defined on page 207 as the “minimizing the total amount of
evolution that must have occurred in the genetic tree”, although I fail to understand the
numerical illustration provided on the same page). In addition, (Sober, 1994, Chapter
7) makes a similar point in somehow more accessible (if non-statistical) terms.
“Instead of evaluating hypotheses in terms of how probable they say the data are,
we evaluate them by estimating how accurately they’ll predict new data when
fitted to old.” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.229
The chapter also addresses the distinction between hypothesis testing and model
selection as paramount—a point I subscribed to for a long while before getting convinced
of the opposite—, but I cannot get to the core of this argument. It seems Sober sees
model selection through the predictive performances of the models under comparison,
if the above quote is representative of his thesis. (Overall, I find the style of the chapter
slightly uneven, as if the fact that some sections like Section 3.7 are adapted from earlier
papers would make for different levels of depth.)
Statistically speaking, this chapter also has a difficulty with the continuity assump-
tion. To make this point more precise, I notice there is a long discussion about reaching
the optimum configuration (for polar bear fur length) under the SPD hypothesis, but I
think evolution happens in discontinuous moves. (Think for instance of changes in the
number of chromosomes.) The case about the existence of a local minimum in Section
3.4 and the difficulty in moving from a local mode with a global mode is characteristic
of this difficulty as a “valley” on a “fitness curve” that in essence takes three possible
values over the three different types of eye designs does not really constitute a bottleneck
in the optimisation process. Similarly, the temporal structure of the statistical models
in Sections 3.3 and 3.5 is never mentioned, even though it needs to be defined for the
tests to take place. (For instance, in several places, time is mentioned without a clear
definition. I have trouble to understand how a finite time or even the original time t = 0
can be assessed in such settings.) The past versus current convergence to stationarity
or equilibrium and hence to optimality under the SPD hypothesis is an issue and so is
the definition of time in the very simple 2×2 Markov chain example? And given a 2×2
contingency table like
fixed polymorphic
synonymous 17 42
nonsynonymous 7 2
testing for independence between both factors is a standard among the standards: I
thus fail to understand the lengthy and inconclusive discussion of pages 240-243.4 An-
4The presentation of the 2×2 contingency tables in Figure 4.11 is fairly unusual in that the position
of the counts and the factor values are inverted.
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other statistical difficulty relates to the implicit use of plug-in estimates and to Sober’s
reluctance to adopt Bayesian arguments based on marginals: in the discussion on pages
255-256 about inferring on phylogenetic trees, the Markovian independence between
branches of the trees given the first level ancestors is confused with the impossibil-
ity of running inference “on ancestors that are ‘deeper.’” The independence between
non-contiguous nodes of the tree only holds conditional on the intermediate nodes. It
vanishes when integrating over the intermediate nodes.
5 Common or separate ancestry
“Darwinians would not be satisfied if all life on Earth derived from the same large
slab of rock.” p.269
The final chapter of the book (apart from the concluding summary) is about common
ancestry and may be the most statistically oriented of the three last chapters. This is
not to say the chapter is without defaults, including in particular a certain tendency to
repeat the same arguments. but this is somehow the chapter I appreciated the most.
The chapter starts with a detailed analysis on how the hypothesis of common ancestry
should be set, the main distinction being between one organism and several, while
pointing out the confusing effect of lateral gene transfer. Inference about phylogenetic
trees and the use of genetic sequences rather than simplistic traits gets us closer to
the true issues at stake. Another interesting feature of this chapter is the relation to
Darwin’s reflections on the common origin of life on Earth through many quotes.
“If those prior probabilities are obscure, the same will be true of the posterior
probabilities.” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.277
The statistical issue is thus of testing for a common ancestor versus separate an-
cestors for a set of organisms. The nature of the information contained in the data is
never made precise enough to understand whether this fits the principle of total evi-
dence stressed throughout the book. The chapter also shows a more lenient disposition
towards Bayesian solutions (relying on priors on page 301) but Section 4.3 ends up
with a damning statement, due to the impossibility of defining an objective prior be-
cause Sober wants prior probabilities that have some authority. This is a self-defeating
constraint leading to empirically well-grounded priors (page 276).
“Those propositions suffice for similarity to be evidence for common ancestry, and
they have broad applicability.” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.283
The part about Reichenbach’s (1956) sufficient condition for a common trait to
induce a likelihood ratio larger than one in favour of the common ancestor hypothesis
needs to be discussed as this is the point I find the most puzzling in the chapter.
Indeed, most of the nine assumptions of Reichenbach (1956) relate both models under
comparison, i.e. common ancestry versus separate ancestry by
Pr(X = i|Z = j) = Pr(X = i|Z1 = j) , Pr(Y = i|Z = j) = Pr(Y = i|Z2 = j) ,
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and
Pr(Z = j) = Pr(Z1 = j) = Pr(Z2 = j) ,
where X and Y are the observed character traits for two species, and where Z is the
common ancestor trait, while Z1 and Z2 are the separate ancestor traits. This type
of assumptions is statistically and philosophically meaningless in the sense that models
under comparison should not share any of their parameters. If the point is about
determining which model is “true”, the “wrong” model does not exist, there is no Z
or no (Z1, Z2), hence the corresponding parameters do not have any substance either.
For instance, when building a Bayesian model to compare those models, there exists
a separate prior distribution on each group of parameters. The common parameter
assumption is thus not compatible with selecting one of the two models. This unrealistic
framework may be the result of a reluctance to handle true (i.e., unknown) parameters
as in a regular statistical analysis. (See, e.g., the lament that “until values for adjustable
parameters are specified, we cannot talk about the probability of the data under different
hypotheses”, page 338.) What is striking is the reliance of the whole chapter on this
unnatural set of hypotheses since it keeps resurfacing throughout the chapter. Sober
writes that Propositions 1-9 are not consequences of the axioms of probability. Neither
are they necessary conditions for common ancestry to have a higher likelihood than
separate ancestry (page 283). Nonetheless, this is creating an unnecessary bias in the
perception of the problem which may induce critics of evolution to reject the whole
approach.
“If there was no such common ancestor, what would alignment ever mean?” Elliott
Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.291
The theme of the missing model I have alluded to in the previous posts is also
recurrent in this chapter. There are a lot of paragraphs about the choice of the rep-
resentation of the difference between two species, from trait to gene sequence, and the
author acknowledges that the difficulty in this choice has to do with a requirement for
a more advanced theoretical representation (model) adapted to more complex data.
This sounds rather obvious stated that way but the book wanders around this point for
pages. (An example is the above quote that misses the point about sequence alignment:
this is a perfectly well-defined measure of distance, common ancestor5 or not.) And the
overall conclusion is a vague call for the principle of total evidence (which is a rephrasing
of the likelihood principle), after rightly dismissing the majority rule (page 295). As
illustrated by the section on multiple characters, the discussion is confusing without a
proper model. It is only on page 300 of the book that a completely defined model for the
evolution of a dichotomous trait (i.e. the simplest possible case) appears.6 This model is
a rather crude tool, as it depends on arbitrary calibration factors like P (Z = 0) = 0.99
(instead of the absorbing 1) and, more importantly, on an unspecified time t (as in
5An interesting discussion appears on page 291 about the bias induced by alignment, the conclusion
being that “aligning sequences is not loading the dice”. I think that alignment is akin to maximum
likelihood plug-in and that it is therefore favouring the null hypothesis. It should therefore be accounted
for in the statistical procedure.
6A minor point of contention there is the use of bias for the Markovian model on chromosome
transformation, where reversibility would have been more appropriate.
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“what time is it on the evolution clock?”). The corresponding likelihood ratio is then
(under one of the selection schemes)
0.01b2
t
+ 0.99
[0.01bt + 0.99]2
where the dependence on those calibration factors is obvious. This illustrates the im-
possibility to reach a satisfactory conclusion without going first through a statistical
analysis of the problem.
Although this is not the purpose of the book, I think the debate about causality
found therein is rather superficial. For instance, while, in Section 3.6, causality and
correlation are differentiated (see footnote 22 on page 224 and page 233) Section 3.8
embarks upon testing for a causal connection, discussing Reichenbach (1956) without
mentioning the Humean thesis of the logical and statistical impossibility of such a test.
Most of Chapter 4 is about testing “whether there was a common cause” (page 247).
A notion of information is mentioned on page 305 without being defined and I do not
understand whether or not this relates to Fisher’s information (Lehmann and Casella,
1998) or to the Kullback divergence, as, apparently, no parameter is involved.
“It is possible for data to discriminate among a set of hypotheses without saying
anything about a proposition that is common to all the alternatives considered.”
Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.315
The debate about the phylogenetic tree reconstruction versus the test for common
ancestry (Sections 4.7 and 4.8) lacks appeals for the very reason exposed above. The
tree structure may be incorporated within the model(s) and integrated out in a Bayesian
fashion to provide the marginal likelihood of the model(s). Although this seems to be
an important issue, as illustrated by the controversy with Templeton (Templeton, 2008;
Beaumont et al., 2010), the opposition between likelihood inference and “cladistic” par-
simony is not properly conducted in that, as a na¨ıve reader, I cannot understand Sober’
presentation of the later. This section is much more open to Bayesian processing by
abstaining from the usual criticism about the lack of objectivity of the prior selection,
but it entirely misses the ability of the Bayesian approach to integrate out the nuisance
parameters, whether they are the tree topology (standard marginalisation) or the model
index (model averaging). The debate about the limited meaning of statistical consis-
tency is making the valid point that consistency only puts light on the case when the
hypothesised model is true, but extended consistency could have been considered as
well, namely that the procedure will bring the hypothesised model as close as possible
to the “true” model within the hypothesised family of models. What I gather from
this final section is that cladistic parsimony tries to do without models (if not without
assumptions), which seems to relate to Templeton’s views about Bayesian inference.
This is the most enjoyable chapter of the book from my point of view, even though
the lack of real illustrations makes it less potent than it could be. It also shows the
limitation of a philosophical debate on simplistic idealisations of the real model. The
book rarely acknowledges (see pages 236 and 334) that genealogical hypotheses are
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composite. An incorporation of the parameter estimation in the inferential process
would have improved the depth of the debate.
6 Conclusion
“A quantitative assessment of goodness of fit is indispensable when evolutionary
models are compared.” Elliott Sober, Evolution and Evidence, p.362
Evidence and Evolution is very well-written, with hardly any typo (the unbiasedness
property of AIC is stated at the bottom of page 101 with the expectation symbol E on
the wrong side of the equation, Figure 3.8c is used instead of Figure 3.7c on page 204,
Figure 4.7 is used instead of Figure 4.8 on page 293, Simon Tavare´’s name is always
spelled Tavere´, vaules rather than values is repeated four times on page 339). The style is
sometimes too light and often too verbose, with an abundance of analogies that I regard
as sidetracking, but this makes for an easier reading (except for the sentence “the key to
answering the second question is that the observation that X = 1 and Y = 1 produces
stronger evidence favoring CA over SA the lower the probability is that the ancestors
postulated by the two hypotheses were in state 1”, on page 314, that still eludes me!). As
detailed in this review, I have points of contentions with the philosophical views about
testing in Evidence and Evolution as well as about the methods exposed therein, but this
does not detract from the appeal of reading the book. (The lack of completely worked
out statistical hypotheses in realistic settings remains the major issue in my criticism of
the book.) While the criticisms of the Bayesian paradigm are often shallow (like the one
on page 97 ridiculing Bayesians drawing inference based on a single observation), there
is nothing fundamentally wrong with the statistical foundations of the book. I therefore
repeat my earlier recommendation in favour of Evidence and Evolution, Chapters 1
and (paradoxically) 5 being the easier entries. Obviously, readers familiar with Sober’s
earlier papers and books will most likely find a huge overlap with those but others
will gather Sober’s viewpoints on the notion of testing hypotheses in a (mostly) unified
perspective.
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